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Abstract
This paper presents consideration of how a subsidy for the elderly care services should be financed
in terms of income growth and social welfare. An increase in the tax burden for older people and
firm with a decrease in the tax burden for young people can raise the income growth rate. However,
the policy to decrease the unemployment to increase tax revenue by virtue of an increase in labor
input can raise the income growth rate if the unemployment rate is low. Even if these tax systems
increase the income growth rate, social welfare can not always be pulled up because an increase in
the tax burden for older people worsens the welfare of older people.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an examination of a subsidy for elderly care services to raise social welfare. Concretely,
this paper presents consideration of some tax means and derives how the tax system should be set in
terms of social welfare. No other report in the literature describes a study that examines a multiple tax
system in subsidies or elderly care services.
Many studies examine elderly care services. Pauly (1990) insists on the necessity for the public long-
term care insurance. Cremer and Pestieau (2011) and Cremer and Roeder (2012) report a private subsidy
for private elderly care in addition to public elderly care services. The subsidy for elderly care services
brings about moral hazard by which the total amount of elderly care cost increases, which brings about
the social inefficiency as derived by Richter and Ritzberger (1995).1 Even if the moral hazard problem
exists in subsidy for elderly care services, Smith and Witter (2004) show that elderly care services entail
the positive effects of risk pooling. Miyazawa, Moudoukoutas and Yagi (2000) obtain the result that
public long-term care is better than private long-term care insurance. Papers described above present
the necessity for publicly provided elderly care insurance.
Some studies examine how subsidies for elderly service care affect the macroeconomic status. Korn
and Werde (2012) derive the effects on the female labor supply by a subsidy for elderly care services.
Mou and Winer (2012) show that the subsidy for elderly care services affects the purchase of elderly care
services supplied in the market and the substitution between elderly care services and informal care given
by children and others.
Subsidies for elderly care services are examined in terms of social welfare. Tabata (2005) derives that
the subsidy for elderly care services can raise the utility of the present generation instead of a decrease
in the utility of future generations. Mizushima (2009) derives the tax rate to maximize social welfare.
Miyazawa (2010) considers subsidies as cash (pension and others) or in-kind (medical services, elderly
care services, and others).
Colombo et al. (2011) survey a study of long-term care in OECD countries. In 2008, average public
spending on long-term care was 1.5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008. Not only in Japan
but also in OECD countries, an aging society is progressing. Cremer and Pestieau (2012) show an
1Because of elderly care insurance, people do not make an effort not to be in elderly care. Then people are apt to require
elderly care.
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increase in the elderly care services because of an aging society. Therefore, it is important to examine
the subsidy for elderly care services in aging societies. Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998) and Hashimoto
and Tabata (2010) set a two sector model with an elderly care sector, which differs from the final goods
sector. Hashimoto and Tabata (2010) show that labor in the elderly care sector increases with the aging
of society.
[Insert Fig.1 around here.]
In Japan, aging of society is progressing quickly. The cost for elderly care continues to increase. The
ratio of elderly people to total population is shown in Fig. 1.2 Elderly care insurance (substantially
equivalent to a subsidy for elderly care) is financed by taxes and premiums. The premium is financed
not only by older people but also by younger people.3 This paper shows how the difference taxation to
finance the subsidy for elderly care affects the income growth rate and social welfare. Furthermore, this
paper shows how the government should collect tax revenue.
The results presented in this paper are the following. An increase in the tax burden for older people
or firms instead of a decrease in tax burden for younger people can raise the income growth rate because
it facilitates capital accumulation. However, the policy to decrease the unemployment rate and then to
increase tax revenues because of an increase in the employment rate instead of a decrease in the tax
burden for younger people can raise the income growth rate if the unemployment rate is low. In an aging
society with fewer children, it is important to maintain the labor supply. In addition to an increase in
fertility, an increase in the labor participation rate can contribute to maintenance of the labor supply.
This paper presents consideration of this issue as cutting of the unemployment rate.
Even if the income growth rate increases, social welfare does not always increase. The tax burden for
older people raises the income growth rate. However, a tax burden for older people decreases their utility
and intergenerational conflict might worsen.
The remainder of this paper consists of the following. Section 2 explains the model settings. Section
3 derives the equilibrium. Section 4 derives how the change of tax system to finance elderly care services
2The ratio of elderly people to total population reached 25% in 2013 (Data: Population Estimates, Statistics Japan).
3Elderly care insurance is financed 50%bytaxes, Older people (more than 65 years old) 19% and younger people (40–64
years old) 31% at 2014. The premium increases with age, as shown in Fig. 1. In the elderly care insurance system in Japan,
the premium for elderly people is revised every three years. Moreover, half of the premium for younger people is paid by
the employer.
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affects both the income growth rate and social welfare. The final section concludes this paper.
2 Model
This model economy has three agents: households, firms, and government. This section explains the
model settings.
2.1 Household
Individuals live in two periods: young and old periods. Our paper presents consideration of an overlapping-
generations model. A young generation and old generation exist in each period. The model includes no
population growth. The population size is assumed as unity over time. The household utility function is
assumed by the following log utility function as4
ut = α ln c1t + β ln c2t+1 + (1− α− β) ln et+1, 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1, α+ β < 1, (1)
where c1t and c2t+1 respectively denote consumption by young and old people. The older people consume
elderly care services et+1 themselves.5 t denotes the period. In the young period, younger people work
inelastically to gain wage income, which is allocated into the consumption in young period and the
saving to consume and to receive elderly care services in the old period. However, this paper presents
consideration of unemployment and some young persons can work. Others can not work because of a
lack of jobs. The government places the tax burden to provide a subsidy for elderly care services and the
benefit for unemployment. Defining lt as employment rate, the household’s lifetime budget constraint is
shown as
c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt+1
+ (1− dt+1) et+11 + rt+1 = (1− τl − σ)ltwt + (1− lt)ut −
Tt+1
1 + rt+1
. (2)
1 + rt+1 and wt denotes an interest rate and wage rate. τl denotes the tax rate to subsidize elderly care
services. Tt is defined as the tax burden for older people to subsidize elderly care services that are given
proportionally by the rate of dt+1. The government provides unemployment benefit ut financed by tax
4This paper does not consider uncertainty for elderly care and precautionary saving. With precautionary saving, house-
hold savings increase more than the saving in this deterministic model economy. Long-term care and precautionary saving
were analyzed by Hemmi, Tabata and Futagami (2007). This paper assumes a deterministic economy model for ease of
analysis.
5The elderly care services for older people are provided not only by themselves but also by children or offspring, as
shown by the model presented in earlier studies. This paper assumes that elderly care for older people is provided only by
themselves.
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rate σ. We obtain the following allocations to maximize the utility (1) subject to the life time budget
constraint (2),6
c1t = α
(
(1− τl − σ)ltwt + (1− lt)ut − Tt+11 + rt+1
)
, (3)
c2t+1 = β(1 + rt+1)
(
(1− τl − σ)ltwt + (1− lt)ut − Tt+11 + rt+1
)
, (4)
et+1 =
(1 + rt+1)(1− α− β)
1− dt+1
(
(1− τl − σ)ltwt + (1− lt)ut − Tt+11 + rt+1
)
. (5)
2.2 Firm
Firms produce the final goods with capital stock and labor input in a perfectly competitive market. The
product function is assumed as
Yt = K
γ
t (AtNt)
1−γ , 0 < γ < 1. (6)
Therein, Yt denotes the final goods.7 Kt and Nt denote the capital stock and the labor input in t period.
At denotes the labor productivity, which is assumed as At ≡ aKtNt (a is a positive constant parameter).8
Now, for these analyses we assume that the government levies a wage-based tax burden for the firm
because of the subsidy for elderly care services at the rate of τf . Then, the firm’s profit pit is given as
pit = K
γ
t (AtNt)1−γ − (1 + τf )wtNt − (1 + rt)Kt. Maximizing the firm’s profit in competitive market, the
demand for the physical capital stock and labor input are shown as
wt =
1− γ
1 + τf
(
Kt
Nt
)γ
A1−γt , (7)
1 + rt = γK
γ−1
t (AtNt)
1−γ , (8)
It is assumed that the physical capital stock is fully depreciated in one period.
2.3 Government
The government provides not only subsidies for elderly care services but also benefits to compensate for
unemployment. The subsidy for elderly care services is financed by taxation of younger people and older
6This model includes the assumption that large size households that includes some people works and other people are
in unemployment.
7This model economy considers one type of final good that is available for consumption goods and elderly care services.
However, being different from this setting, Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998) and Hashimoto and Tabata (2010) set a two-sector
model that the elderly care service sector exist and consider the labor mobility between two sectors.
8Romer (1986) sets the endogenous growth model with externality of physical capital. Grossman and Yanagawa (1993)
specify the externality of physical capital such as At = a
Kt
Nt
.
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people. Then, assuming Tt = τowt and a balanced budget, the budget constraint for a subsidy for elderly
care services is
dtet = (nlt(τl + τf ) + τo)wt, (9)
where n denotes the gross rate of increase in population or the intergeneration population ratio of younger
people population size Lt to older people population size Lt−1. Here, n is assumed to be constant over
time. Next, the government also provides unemployment benefits. If the unemployment benefit is given
by the balanced budget, then ltσwt = (1− lt)ut, i.e., we obtain the following:
ut =
ltσwt
1− lt . (10)
2.4 Labor Union
This model includes a labor union. The labor union cares not only about wage rate wt, but also about
employment rate lt
(
≡ NtLt
)
. The labor union decides the wage rate wt to maximize the following function
as considered by Daveri and Tabellini (2000).9
vt = Ntwt + (Lt −Nt)ut
= Lt(ltwt + (1− lt)ut). (11)
Employment rate lt is given as Nt =
(
1−γ
1+τf
) 1
γ
w
− 1γ
t Kt. The wage rate to maximize (11) is derived as
wt =
ut
1− γ . (12)
Both the wage rate wt and unemployment rate 1− lt increase if the unemployment benefit increases.
3 Equilibrium
Defining household’s saving as st ≡ (1 − τl − σ)ltwt + (1 − lt)ut − c1t, the capital market equilibrium
condition Kt+1 = st derives the following dynamics equation of capital stock kt ≡ KtNt as
kt+1
kt
=
(1− α) ((1− τl − σ)l + (1− l)(1− γ)) (1− γ)a1−γ
n(1 + τf )l − ατo(1−γ)a1−γ1+r
. (13)
9Some studies consider the labor union to bring about unemployment. Ono (2010) sets the model by which the labor
union cares about the lifetime income of a household who is employed and in unemployment. Corneo and Marquardt (2000)
consider the Nash negotiation solution within the wage rate and unemployment rate. The model presented in this paper
assumes the household’s income in the young period, as assumed by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). Then, because no pension
benefit is considered, the effect of pension benefit caused by the policy does not exist.
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The employment rate l is constant over time:
l =
1− γ
1− γ + σ . (14)
An increase in σ, which increases unemployment benefit ut, lowers the employment rate. Considering
At = aKtNt , the wage rate and interest rate given by (7) and (8) are given as
wt =
(1− γ)a1−γ
1 + τf
kt, (15)
1 + rt = γa1−γ . (16)
4 How to collect tax revenue to subsidize elderly care
This paper presents an examination of how the subsidy for elderly care services should be financed.
Concretely, this paper presents an examination of an increase in taxation for firms or older people and a
decrease in unemployment with a decrease in taxation for labor income that is gained by young people
without a change of the ratio of the amount of subsidy for elderly care services to wages dtetwt . First, this
subsection presents analysis of the policy effects on the income growth rate.
4.1 Effect on Income Growth
First, we consider the case of an increase in taxation for firm τf with a decrease in taxation for wage
income τl. Then, we obtain dτl = −dτf at the approximation of τf = 0 because of the government budget
constraint (9) and no change of dtetwt . Income growth rate 1 + g is given by
kt+1
kt
at the balanced growth
path. We obtain the sign of dgdτf as shown below:
dg
dτf
=
(1− α)(1− γ)a1−γ
nl
(l − ((1− τl − σ)l + (1− l)(1− γ))) . (17)
With l > 1−γ1−γ+τl+σ , we obtain the positive sign of
dg
dτl
. However, we obtain l = 1−γ1−γ+σ . Therefore, an
increase in τf with a decrease in τl always raises the income growth rate 1 + g.
Second, we consider the case in an increase in taxation for older people τo with a decrease in taxation
for younger people τl. Then, considering that the government budget constraint reduces to dτl = − 1nldτo,
the income growth rate can always be pulled up by this policy because of the following:
dg
dτo
=
(1− α)(1− γ)a1−γ
nl2
(
l
n
+ ((1− τl − σ)l + (1− l)(1− γ))α(1− γ)a
1−γ
n2(1 + r)
)
> 0. (18)
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Third, we consider the policy of a decrease in unemployment rate to increase labor demand. The unem-
ployment benefit decreases the rise in the unemployment rate. An increase in labor demand reduces the
unemployment rate and increases tax revenue. Then the government can decrease the tax rate τl under
a constant tax revenue. Then, we obtain dτl =
τl(1−γ)
l(1−γ+σ)2 dσ. Calculating
dg
dσ shows the following.
dg
dσ
=
(1− α)(1− γ)a1−γ
nl2
((
1− γ
1− γ + σ
)2
− lτl(1− γ)
(1− γ + σ)2 − l
2
)
(19)
We can find the employment rate l = l∗ to be dgdσ = 0 because the bracket at the right-hand side decreases
with an increase in l. Then, with l∗ < l, we obtain dgdσ < 0: if the employment rate l is large level that
is more than l∗, then an increase in labor input with a decrease in unemployment benefit increases the
income growth rate. The following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 An increase in taxation for firms and the older generation with a decrease in taxation for
the young generation to subsidize elderly care services can always raise the income growth rate. However,
a decrease in the unemployment rate to increase tax revenues decreases the income growth rate in the
case of a high unemployment rate.
An increase in the tax burden for older people has a positive effect on savings because households
maintain the consumption level for older people. A decrease in the tax burden for younger people raises
savings because of an increase in household disposable income during the young period. An increase
in the tax burden for the firms with a decrease in tax burden for younger people can raise the income
growth rate in this model. The tax burden for firms has a negative effect on saving. The firm reduces
the wage rate for the employees because the unit labor cost increases as a result of the tax burden for
firms. However, a decrease in the tax burden for younger people increases savings. This positive effect
on savings is greater than the negative one in this model. Ono (2010) sets a model that includes the
public pension and unemployment and which derives that tax burden for both younger people and firms
reduces the income growth rate. This paper presents analysis of an increase in tax burdens for firms with
a decrease in tax burdens for younger people. This case has a positive effect on income growth.
This paper presents consideration of the policy of a decrease in unemployment rate with cutting of
unemployment benefits. Then, a decrease in the unemployment rate decreases not only the unemployment
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rate but also the wage rate determined by a labor union function. These decreases reduce the household
income. However, a decrease in the unemployment rate signifies a transformation from unemployment to
employment. This effect has a positive effect on saving. As described in this paper, if the unemployment
rate is low, then this positive effect on savings is large. The income growth rate increases.
4.2 Welfare Analysis
This subsection presents an examination of how social welfare is affected by the policies. This paper
assumes social welfare as
Wt =
∞∑
s=t
ρs−t−1(ρα ln c1s + β ln c2s + (1− α− β) ln es)
=
1
1− ρ lnwt +
α+ β
1− ρ lnX +
1− α− β
1− ρ lnY +
ρ
(1− ρ)2 ln(1 + g)
+
1
ρ
(β ln c2t + (1− α− β) ln et) + const, (20)
where
X = (1− τl − σ)l + (1− γ)l − τo(1 + g)1 + r ,
Y = (1 + r)(1− α− β)
(
(1− τl − σ)l + (1− l)(1− γ)− τo(1 + g)1 + r
)
+ (nl(τl + τf ) + τo)(1 + g),
const. =
α
1− ρ lnα+
β
1− ρ lnβ +
β
1− ρ ln(1 + r)
First, we examine an increase in τf with a decrease in τl without any change of the elderly care service
level. The condition to have dWtdτf > 0 is
dg
dτf
>
(
1− (α+β)lX − (1−α−β)
2(1+r)l
Y
)
(1− α− β)nlτlY + ρ1−ρ 11+g
. (21)
That is, if the income growth rate increases sufficiently, then the social welfare increases because Y
increases with 1 + g and the amount of the right-hand-side decreases. Next, we examine an increase in
τo with a decrease in τl. The condition to have dWtdτo is
dg
dτo
>
(
1+g
1+r − 1n
) (
(α+ β) + (1− α− β) 1Y (1 + r)(1− α− β)
)
+ β
2(1−ρ)
ρ
wt
c2t
+ (1−α−β)
2(1−ρ)wt
ρet
(1− α− β)nlτlY + ρ1−ρ 11+g
. (22)
Although n(1+g) < 1+r, social welfare can not always be raised by this policy because β
2
ρ
wt
c2t
+ (1−α−β)
2wt
ρet
.
Therefore, if 1+r is sufficiently larger than n(1+g), then we might obtain dWdτo > 0 because of the negative
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sign of the right-hand side of (22). Finally, we consider the policy of a decrease in the unemployment
rate to increase labor demand. The condition to have dWtdσ < 0 is
dg
dσ
<
− 1−γ(1−γ+σ)2l − (1−ρ)(1−α−β)(1−γ)ρ(1−γ+σ)2 nτlwtet +
(
(α+ β) 1X + (1− α− β)(1 + r) 1Y
) ( (1−γ)(2−γ−σ)
(1−γ+σ)2 + l
)
(1− α− β)nlτlY + ρ1−ρ 11+g
.
(23)
Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 2 An increase in the tax burden for a firm with a decrease in the tax burden for younger
people can raise the social welfare if the income growth rate is sufficiently large to hold (21). An increase
in the tax burden for older people with a decrease in the tax burden for younger people can raise the
level of social welfare if the interest rate is sufficient to be less than the income growth rate and the
population growth rate holds as in (22). A decrease in unemployment to increase tax revenue raises the
level of social welfare if (23) holds.
It is the intuitive result that even if the income growth rises, social welfare decreases. The tax burden
for older people caused by cutting the tax burden for younger people raises the income growth rate. An
increase in income growth pulls up the future generation’s utility. However, the tax burden for older
people decreases their utility. They can not receive benefits from income growth.
The tax burden for firms increases the income growth rate. This effect raises the future generation’s
utility. However, an increase in tax burden for firm reduces the wage rate, as shown by (15). A decrease
in the wage rate reduces both the present generation and future generation’s utility. If we make ρ close
to one, then we can find that the right-hand side of (21) and (22) is nearly zero. Consequently, we obtain
the condition shown by (21) easily: if the government cares to a considerable degree about the future
generation’s utility, then the social welfare can be pulled up by virtue of a change in financing a subsidy
for elderly care services.
A decrease in the unemployment rate can not always raise the level of social welfare. Similarly with
income growth, a decrease in unemployment brought by a decrease in the unemployment rate can not
always raise the household disposable income. Then the effect on the social welfare is ambiguous.
This paper does not provide any method to ascertain the optimal subsidy for elderly care. However,
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this paper describes a case in which the social welfare maximized optimal subsidy for elderly care financed
only by taxation for labor income can rise by a change in financing subsidies for elderly care services.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents consideration of how the subsidy for the elderly care services is financed in terms of
income growth and social welfare. The income growth rate is pulled up by a policy of an increase in the
tax burden for older people and firms instead of a decrease in the burden for younger people. The policy
to reduce unemployment can raise the income growth rate if the unemployment rate is low. These results
show that the tax burden for firms and older people should increase instead of a decrease in tax burden
for younger people in terms of income growth.
Moreover, this paper presents an examination of how these policies affect social welfare. Even if
these policies can raise the income growth rate, social welfare can not always be pulled up because of
intergenerational conflict. For example, an increase in the burden for older people can raise the income
growth rate, which is better for the utility of young people and children. However, the utility of older
people decreases because of an increase in the tax burden.
This paper presents consideration of a subsidy for elderly care services as the social security for older
people and derives how the government should collect tax revenue to provide subsidies for elderly care
services. Although this paper presents consideration of subsidies for elderly care services, the result
obtained in this paper is applicable to other social security systems for older people such as pensions. For
instance, pensions are financed not only by taxes for younger people but also by taxes for older people
in Japan. The analyses explained in this paper show that we can consider methods for intergenerational
transfer, but also for intragenerational transfer.
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Appendix
Social Welfare Function
Considering that c1t+1 = (1 + g)c1t, c2t+2 = c2t+1, et+2 = et+1, the following social welfare function is
obtained.
Wt =
α lnα+ β lnβ + β ln(1 + r)
1− ρ +
lnwt
1− ρ +
(α+ β) lnX + (1− α− β) lnY
1− ρ +
ρ ln(1 + g)
(1− ρ)2
=
β ln c2t + (1− α− β) ln et
ρ
. (24)
where
et = (1 + r)(1− α− β)
(
(1− τl,t−1 − σt−1)lt−1wt−1 + (1− lt−1)(1− γ)wt−1 − τowt1 + r
)
+ (nl(τl + τf ) + τo)wt, (25)
c2t = β(1 + r)
(
((1− τl,t−1 − σt−1)lt−1 + (1− γ)lt−1)wt−1 − τowt1 + r
)
. (26)
The policy to change the tax rate or the benefit for unemployment is in t and after t period. It is
noteworthy that policy parameters such as τl, τf and σ do not change or are treated fix valuables in the
t− 1 period. Comparative statics casts the policy variables in t− 1 period as fixed variables.
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Figure 1 Elderly Care Cost and Premium.
(Data: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)
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